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Abstract
Financial reporting practices have developed rapidly since the establishment of China’s 
equity market in 1990. More decision-useful accounting information is required by the 
investors. An understanding and insight of how the development of equity market has 
influenced the accounting reform is important in facilitating international convergence of 
accounting standards and practices. This study investigates the influence of the equity 
market on accounting reform in China. In this study, I hypothesize that the requirement 
for the decision-usefulness of accounting information disclosure is the main motivation 
for the development of the CAS. I analyze the problems of accounting information 
derived from the immature equity market by identifying the three issues: (1) special 
ownership structures, (2) weak corporate governance mechanism of the listed 
companies, and (3) the segmentation of the equity market. Examples are given to 
present the unreliability of accounting information through accounting manipulation and 
even financial frauds, and the lack of understandability and comparability of accounting 
information across countries. Finally, I discuss the responses of accounting reform to 
the requirement for accounting information derived from equity market from two aspects: 
(1) narrowing the gaps of accounting practices between the CAS and the IAS and (2) 
regulations of and requirements for information disclosure.
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Abbreviations
ASBE Accounting standards for Business
Enterprises
CAS Chinese Accounting Standards
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICPA Chinese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission
EAS Enterprise Accounting System
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board
FASC Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts
FIBV World Federation of Exchanges
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IAS International Accounting Standard
Committee
IASB International Accounting Standard Board
IASC International Accounting Standard
Committee
IPO Initial Public Offering
MoF Ministry of Finance
ROE Return on Equity
SFAC Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts
SHSE Shanghai Stock Exchange
SOE State Owned Enterprises
SEC Securities Exchange Committee
SZSE Shanghai Stock Exchange
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1. Aims and Objectives
After decades of heavy government involvement in the economy, China has embraced 
a market-liberalization program. State intervention in enterprise management, 
particularly through SOEs, is being systematically dismantled. Prior research evidence 
indicates that over the last decade the modernization and restructuring of SOEs have 
been placed at the top of the economic-reform agenda.
The environment in which a country operates shapes its national accounting practices 
(Walton et al., 2003; P2). Hopwood (1987) discusses the interrelation between 
accounting changes and the social context, and pointes out that accounting is not static 
but changeable in response to interrelated changes in society. With the trends of 
economic modernization, the old accounting systems in china which was designed to 
serve the centrally controlled economy has dramatically changed (Tang, 2000). The 
need for China’s accounting reform has been influenced by many factors (Zhang, 2005), 
including involvement of the Chinese government in macro-economic management, the 
increasing complexity of business transactions, diversified business ownership in a 
variety of industries, and the expansion of the securities market. Also, Chinese 
companies seeking to raise capital in the international capital markets are faced with the 
challenge of restating their financial statements to international standards. “Investors 
demand greater transparency and accountability. China moves to bring the accounts of 
listed companies closer to international standards” (Xue and Tian, 2000; p13).
In order to accommodate the rapidly changing economic environment, the accounting
reform in China becomes an important aspect of the financial and economy reform.
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International accounting practice was regarded as the basis for re-engineering the 
accounting system (Tang, 2000).
My study aims to look at the relationship between the Chinese accounting reform and 
the development of equity market in China. Although the environment of the Chinese 
accounting system have been discussed in several prior academic studies (e.g., Xiang, 
1998; Xiao et al., 2004), especially the significant role of political ideology in shaping 
accounting system in China (Hilmy, 1999; Graham and Li, 1997; Zhang, 2005; Ezzamel 
et al, 2007), but few of them investigate the in-depth influence of equity market on 
accounting system. Although the market is young with a history of only 18 years, it 
developed very rapidly and made strong demands on accounting reform and 
convergence towards the IAS. This study pointed out the unique issues and problems in 
the development of equity market in a transition economy, such as state-owned listed 
companies, weak corporate governance mechanism, and the segmentation of the 
equity market. These problems lead to the lack of decision-useful accounting 
information. This study provides insight into how the problems were made efforts to 
solve in accounting system reform in China. Such insights may facilitate understandings 
of the challenges in achieving international accounting harmonization in China.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section provides the background to 
the study and the theoretical framework. The methods of data collection are described 
in Section 3. Section 4 describes data analysis. Section 5 contains data interpretation. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical Framework
My research is built upon Nobes’ model (Nobes, 1998) for classification of differences of 
financial reporting and Ball’s argument regarding demands for accounting information.
Nobes’ (1998) model is relevant to an examination of why different countries use 
different financial reporting systems. The model proposes that culture influences the 
financing system in a country, which in turn influences the accounting system. He 
divides the financing systems into two types: strong credit-based system and strong 
equity-based system. This division was developed and related to source of finance.
Nobes emphasizes that differences in source of finance lead to differences in the 
purpose of accounting and determine which type of accounting a country uses. He 
classified accounting practices as “strong equity reporting” and “weak equity reporting”, 
which are also respectively referred to generally as “shareholder model” for market- 
oriented common-law countries and “stakeholder model” for code-law countries (Nobes 
and Parker ,2005). Two classes of accounting, Class A and Class B, are proposed by 
Nobes (1998). Class A accounting occurs where there is a strong equity market and 
accounting provides information for outside shareholders. These countries mainly 
include UK, the US and Australia. Class B corresponds with credit-oriented financing 
and focus on accounting for creditors and tax purpose, and examples of Class B
countries are France, Germany and Italy. ,
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Nobes (1998) takes the example of China as ‘a country without a strong equity-outsider 
tradition, but which seems to be moving towards such a system’ ((p. 169). The ratio of 
market capitalization to GDP used to measure the relative importance of the equity 
market in various countries (Nobes and Parker, 2005). We consider the countries 
sampled by Jaggi and Low (2000)—Australia, USA, the UK, Germany, and Japan— and 
add a number of Eastern European countries which resemble China in moving from 
central planning to a market-based economy.
Table 1 Relative Importance of Equity Market
(USD millions)
country Domestic
market
capitalization1
GDP* Market 
capitalization 
to GDP
Strength of 
equity market
Australia 1095858.0 666300 1.64 Strong
U.K. 3794310.3 1903000 2.00 Strong
U.S.A 19286171.5 12980000 1.49 Strong
Japan 4909937.8 4220000 1.16 Strong
Germany 1637609.8 2585000 0.63 Weak and
strengthening
Poland 151809.0 542600 0.28 Weak
Romania 172372.2 556100 0.31 weak
China 1145454.8 10000000 0.11 Weak
1 FIBV annual report (2006)
2 CIA World Factbook (2006)
From Table 1, we could easily find out that the equity market in China is small-scale and 
remains quite unimportant compared to the strong equity-outsider countries and other 
traditional weak equity-outsider countries.
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Ball et al. (2003) argue that financial reporting quality is an endogenous function of 
market demands and political influences that are specific to each country. They point 
out that shareholder-oriented reporting typically gives exclusive corporate governance 
rights to shareholders, and information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through 
public disclosure. The demand for high quality financial reporting and disclosure is 
enforced in a system that is primarily market-based. In code-law countries, 
characterized as stakeholder-oriented reporting, standards setting and enforcement are 
primarily public-sector functions, and information asymmetry is more likely to be 
resolved by “insider” communication with stakeholder representatives. Therefore, there 
is lower demand for high quality public financial reporting and disclosure.
The primary objective of accounting is to satisfy the information needs of financial 
statement beneficiaries (FASB, 1978, SFAC No.1). The demands of financial statement 
users and other interested parties are a driving force for the development of accounting 
standards and practices.
2.2 Historical Development of Accounting System
Prior to 1978, China’s economy was dominated by SOEs which were essentially 
production units to fulfill the states stipulated production quota. The accounting system 
at that time was primarily macro-oriented in that it assisted the state in economic 
planning, implementing state economic policies, and controlling the means of production 
(Ge and Lin, 1993; Ezzamel et al., 2007). The accounting standards used by 
commercial and industrial enterprises were rigid and uniform. There are also uniform
10
budgetary accounting for government agencies and non-profit organizations (Aiken and 
Lu, 1998).
After the open-door policy started in 1978, gradual change in ownership structure 
caused the importance of the state-owned dominance to decrease and non state-owned 
enterprises to increase. In response to the increasing opportunities of foreign direct 
investment, China’s accounting reform commenced in 1985 with the establishment of 
the Accounting Regulations for Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
These regulations provided basic accounting guidelines for joint ventures operating in 
China and for attracting further foreign investment thereafter (Xiang, 1998). From an 
accounting perspective, these regulations for the first time introduced Western 
accounting practice, which was a radical deviation from the traditional accounting (Chow 
eta l., 1995).
State enterprises, once the production units in the centrally planned economy, are now 
endowed with a substantial degree of managerial autonomy and a separation of 
management from ownership (Xiang, 1998). In response to these changes and the 
opening of the stock markets in 1990, a new accounting regime, summarized in Table 2, 
is emerging.
Table 2 the Chinese Accounting Regime: Regulators, Regulations and Applicable 
Enterprises
Regulator_____________ Regulation__________________ Applicable enterprise
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The National People's 
Congress
The State council
Ministry of Finance
The Accounting Law (1985, 
revised in 1993, 1999)
The Audit Law (1994)
The Law on Certified Public 
Accountants (1993)
The Company Law (1993)
The Law for State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises (1988)
Byelaw of Enterprises’ 
Financial Accounting Reports
(2000)
Tentative Regulations on the 
Management of the Issuing 
and Trading of Securities 
(1993)
Provisional Byelaw of Stock 
Issuance and Exchange(1993)
Enterprise Financial Reporting 
Regulation (1999)
the Accounting Regulations for 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese 
and Foreign Investment (1985)
Accounting Regulations for 
Experimental Listed 
Companies (1992)
Accounting Standards for 
Business
Enterprises (1993)
Independent Auditing 
Standards 
( 1995)
All enterprises 
SOEs
Auditing profession
Share capital-based 
companies
SOEs
All enterprises
Share capital-based 
companies
Public issuing companies 
Public issuing companies 
Joint ventures
Public issuing enterprises
All enterprises
All enterprises
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China Securities
Regulatory
Commission
Accounting Regulations for 
Listed Companies (1998)
Enterprise Accounting System 
(2000)
Provisional Regulations on 
Accounting Treatments of 
Assets Sale Among Related 
Parties (2001)
Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises (2006)
Implementing Rules on 
Information Disclosure by 
Public Issuing Companies 
(Trial) (1993)
Standards of Contents and 
Formats of Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing 
Companies
(revised in 1994, 1997,
1998, 1999, 2001,2003)
Answers to the Information 
Disclosure Regulations of 
Public Issuing Companies
(2001)
Regulation for Corporate 
Governance in listed 
Companies (2002)
Preparing Rules of Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing 
Companies issued (2002)
Regulations on Information 
Disclosure of Listed 
Companies (2006)__________
Public issuing companies
All enterprises
Public issuing companies
All enterprises
Public issuing companies
Public issuing companies
Public issuing companies
Public issuing companies 
Public issuing companies 
Public issuing companies
Data source: Xiao (1999); CSRC (2006).
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From Table 2, it can be seen that National People's Congress which represents the 
ultimate power of legislation stipulated a number of basic laws. Under the People's 
Congress, the State Council has also promulgated regulations on a number of important 
issues. Meanwhile, two main bodies have been established by the State Council to be 
responsible for accounting and reporting affairs. One is the MoF which was empowered 
to manage accounting affairs. It issued basic accounting standards and a conceptual 
framework to underpin specific standards. The other body is the CSRC, established by 
the State Council in response to the development of the equity market and regulation of 
financial reporting (Xiao, 1999).
The accounting reform can be roughly divided into three periods after the establishment 
of equity market, according to the three sets of basic accounting standards issued in 
1993, 2000 and 2006 separately.
China initiated its accounting reform in 1992 with the enactment of Accounting 
Regulations for Experimental Listed Companies by the MoF. It applied to all share 
capital-based companies, including the listed companies, and was enacted as a 
response to the corporatization drive of the SOEs. After the issuance, preparation of the 
balance sheet should list equities separately, and report the capital increment in income 
statement. The new regulation was the first set of rules to incorporate international 
accounting practices into reporting requirements for China’s domestic enterprises 
(Xiang, 1998).
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ASBE, China’s first “accounting system”, was issued and became effective in 1993 
(Chen et al., 1999; Lin et al., 2001). It set up a conceptual framework and provided the 
guidelines for following the IAS for financial reporting. In addition, the government made 
efforts to develop a series of transaction-based “practical accounting standards” with the 
financial support of the World Bank and technical assistance from the Big Six 
international accounting firms (Hepp and Chen, 1997).
In 1998, the MoF issued Accounting Regulations for Listed Companies, replacing 
Accounting Regulations for Experimental Listed Companies in 1992 (MoF, 1998). With 
the important breakthrough of the socialist market economy in ownership system, the 
innovation of accounting system was promoted.
In 2000, with the issuance of revised version of the Accounting Law o f the People’s 
Republic o f China and Byelaw o f Enterprises’ Financial Accounting Reports, a new 
Enterprise Accounting System was promulgated to improve the groundwork for China to 
be consistent with the IAS.
In February 2006, the MoF issued of the long-awaited new ASBE which consist of a 
new Basic Standard and 38 Specific ASBEs (Deloitte, 2006). It was influenced by the 
IAS, and some significant changes were introduced, of which the most important shift 
was the introduction of fair value. Therefore, the new Chinese set of accounting 
standards issued in 2006 by the MoF, is usually considered, at least to a large extent,
15
as the ultimate convergence of the Chinese system with the IAS (Biondi and Zhang, 
2007).
2.3 Requirements for Information Disclosure in China
Ma (1998) and Qi et al. (2000) identify the close relationship between SOEs and the 
equity market. The establishment of the equity market in the early 1990s is due to the 
systematic ownership reform of the SOEs, which was thought to be able to largely 
enhance the performances of SOEs (Qi et al., 2000). SOEs remained uninvolved in 
these markets until 1994, when 100 SOEs were selected by the state to be 
“corporatized”. While unprofitable small- and medium-sized SOEs were privatized or 
merged, large SOEs were converted into shareholding companies with limited liabilities, 
and a selected few were listed on China’s two stock exchanges (Yuan, 2000). 
Nowadays, a majority of Chinese stock companies were restructured from the former 
State-owned enterprises.
The traditional accounting information in China was only used to serve the needs of the 
government and managers of enterprises. Since these two users were the same in 
nature in the context of the contemporary China, it was by no means necessary to 
disclose the accounting information (Chen et al., 2005; Ezzamel et al., 2007). However, 
based on Ball et al. (2003), with the development of the equity market, the demands on 
accounting information from public investors were gradually stronger.
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Financial information disclosure of the listed companies has been required since the 
establishment of the SHSE and the SZSE in 1990. The earliest information disclosures 
included mainly the financial status of the companies (in equivalence to a simplified 
balance sheet and the statement of profit and loss), forecasts for the profitability, and 
distributions of dividends (Xue and Tian, 2000). The purpose of the requirements of 
accounting information disclosure is to provide investors with sufficient, reliable and 
comparable information such as business operations and financial position about a 
targeted listing company on time, so as to help the decision-making of investors (CSRC, 
2006).
An equity market regulatory and supervisory body -  the CSRC- was established in 
1992 to establish a centralized supervisory system and strengthen the supervision over 
securities markets. In addition, to raise the standard of information disclosure and 
organize the drafting of laws and regulations for equity markets are the functions of the 
CSRC as well (Xue and Tian, 2000). The CSRC is responsible for reviewing and 
censoring all sorts of reports concerning information disclosure. It determines and 
approves whether companies are qualified for listing and remaining as listed (CSRC, 
2006). As a result, it is an obligation for these companies to submit and present 
accounting information contained in their reports with a manner of accuracy, integrity, 
and authenticity (Chen et al., 2005).
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In China, listed (A-, B-shares and foreign listed shares such as H-shares1) companies 
are requested to disclose accounting information and must follow both the Basic 
Standards (for example, the ASBE issued in 1993, the EAS issued in 2000 and the new 
ASBE issued in 2006) and the Accounting Regulations for Listed Companies. These 
two sets of regulations together govern the requirements for preparing financial 
statements for listed companies and mainly deal with accounting assumptions, 
accounting principles, accounting elements, recognition, measurement and financial 
statement issues, etc. Listed companies are also subject to the regulations released by 
the CSRC.
Apart from preparing financial statements based on the Basic Standards and the 
Accounting Regulations for Listed Companies, B-shares issuing companies have to 
provide summarized financial statements in terms of the IAS. Companies issuing H- 
shares must conform to the disclosure requirements for listing on the Hong Kong Stock
1 A-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China and are 
traded in the mainland A-share markets (SHSE and SZSE). The prices of A-shares 
are quoted in RMB, and currently only mainlanders and selected foreign 
institutional investors are allowed to trade A-shares.
B-shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China and are 
traded in the mainland B-share markets (SHSE and SZSE). B shares are quoted in 
foreign currencies. In the past, only foreigners were allowed to trade B shares. 
Starting from March 2001, mainlanders can trade B shares as well. However, they 
must trade with legal foreign currency accounts.
H- shares are issued by companies incorporated in mainland China and are 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and other foreign stock exchanges.
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Exchange, which has stricter information disclosure requirements than those of A- or 13- 
shares (CSRC, 2006).
Furthermore, the Chinese accounting standards based financial statements must be 
audited by independent accountants, who normally are from Chinese accounting firms 
that are qualified by the CSRC. The IAS based financial statements for B-share 
companies, on the other hand, should be audited by the Big Six (Arthur Andersen, 
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, Coopers & Lybrand, and Price Waterhouse) 
accounting firms and other international firms (CSRC, 1994).
2.4 Hypothesis and Research Questions
Based on Nobes (1998; 2005) and Ball et al. (2003), together with the overview of the 
accounting reform and the development of equity market in China, I developed the 
following hypothesis for my study:
Hypothesis 1: The requirement for the decision-usefulness of accounting information 
disclosure is the main motivation for the development of Chinese accounting system 
towards a class A accounting system.
In general, the usefulness of an accounting system depends upon whether it generates
accounting information that satisfies the decision needs of its users (Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1983). As stated in the SFAC No. 1, issued by the FASB, decision usefulness
is the primary objective of financial accounting (FASB, 1978). Usefulness of information
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includes several qualitative characteristics such as reliability, understandability, 
comparability and so forth (FASB 1980, SFAC no. 2).
Over the last three decades, SOEs lost their shares in the national economy while non- 
state-owned economy consisting of foreign affiliated entities and private businesses 
grew rapidly. Non-government users of accounting information emerged in the course of 
economic diversification. Following the deregulation of government business 
administration, some SOEs have been listed, and business management has been 
increasingly exposed to market pressures. In the changing business environment, 
accounting information is required not only by state economic plans and business 
administration at the macro level but also by external investors, creditors, business 
management, and foreign investors for a great variety of decision-making needs. Thus, 
the new accounting system has expanded changes in the content and format of the 
financial statements to satisfy the requirement for the decision-usefulness of accounting 
information (Ge and Liu, 1995; Chen et al., 2005).
The improvement of accounting information relies on the development of accounting 
system reform (Lin et al., 2001). In my research, the efforts of accounting system 
reform to improve the decision-usefulness of accounting information disclosure are 
divided into two types: accounting standards in convergence towards the IAS, and 
regulations and requirements for information disclosure of listed companies.
The hypothesis mainly focuses on the requirement of accounting information for 
accounting system reform. My research purpose is to investigate the influence of equity
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market on accounting reform. To address the related issues, I developed three specific 
research questions:
Q1. How does the weak equity-outsider market lead to the lack of decision-usefulness 
of accounting information?
Q2: How do the problems of accounting information reflect in financial reporting of 
Chinese listed companies?
Q3: How does the accounting reform respond to the requirements for decision- 
usefulness of accounting information?
3. Methods of Data Collection
This study investigated these questions via a combination of archival data and 
interviews. A combination of these two methods enables us to (1) highlight the facts in 
China’s accounting system reform; (2) explain the facts, and answer research questions. 
In the study, archival data are used to describe the facts about the development of the 
equity market and accounting reform. Archival data are typically large and often national 
samples, as a result, can perform newer and more powerful statistics. They are used as 
pilot data for exploratory study (Shultz et al., 2001). However, archival data research 
can suffer from several disadvantages related to variable specifications and the inability 
to ask qualitative questions (Graham et al., 2005). These problems could be 
compensated by the method of interviews. Interviews provide good opportunities to ask 
people from various interest groups specific questions about the reasons o f problems
derived from equity market and evaluations for the evolutions of accounting standards.
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In addition, Interviews are “most useful for evaluating programs that are seen as 
dynamic or evolving” (Patton, 1987). On the other side, the combination of the two 
methods cross-checks data from different sources to give a more detailed and balanced 
picture of the situation.
The archival data used in the study fall into four categories. The first category consists 
of accounting regulations and rules issued by the Chinese government and the 
regulatory body. The second category consists of secondary academic literature by both 
Western and Chinese scholars. The third consists of economic and accounting data 
regarding the Chinese equity markets and listed companies. A major source of this data 
is the websites of the stock exchange themselves, which contain archival records of 
market filings and transactions. The fourth category is information from Chinese news 
media covering the equity markets and related economic events.
Semi-structured interviews were carried out as supplements of the archival data. Due to 
the tight time schedule and the attribute of the research as a pilot study for my PhD 
dissertation, I have focused on 6 individuals who are identified as closely involved in the 
accounting regulation and accounting practices in the listed companies and equity 
market. The interviewees are from various interest groups, including one accounting 
regulator, two accounting academics, one security market analyst, and two financial 
managers in listed SOEs (see Table 3).
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5 out of the 6 interviews were conducted via telephone, and the only one that was 
carried out face-to-face in London was with the regulator who was introduced by my 
supervisor. Both the academics are from Chinese universities with most prominent 
accounting education. One of them was introduced by my former supervisor. I met the 
other academic and the security market analyst in a seminar concerning Chinese capital 
market environment two years ago and have kept contact since then. The two financial 
managers were introduced by a government official I am familiar with. Both of them 
have worked for large-scale SOEs for over 10 years and taken part in the restructure 
process of this enterprise in mid 1990s.
To preserve anonymity, we designate interviewees as A, B, C, etc. and provide their 
background information in Table 3. The transcripts of interviews conducted in Chinese 
were translated into English by the author.
Table 3 background of interviewees
interviewee Company Experience Date of 
interview
Interviewee A A regulatory body Involved in accounting 
regulation from 1997 to date
06.2008
Interviewee B University 1 Leading accounting 
academic in China. Involved 
in accounting regulation from 
1992 to date
04.2008
Interviewee C University 2 Leading accounting 
academic in China. Involved 
in accounting regulation from 
1998 to date
07.2008
Interviewee D A leading domestic 
security company
Senior equity market analyst. 
Being an analyst for over 10 
years with expertise in
04.2008
23
financial frauds and
information disclosure
Interviewee E Listed state-owned Financial director. Has 04.2008
enterprise 1 worked for the company for
(Shanghai) over 15 years as Internal 
auditor and financial 
manager. Experienced the 
SOEs restructuring and IPO 
in 1995
Interviewee F Listed state-owned Financial manager with 05.2008
enterprise 2 experiences in financial
(Shenzhen) practices of SOEs for over 
10 years
Five interviews were conducted in Chinese, and one in a mixture of English and 
Chinese. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Each interview lasted 
around one hour, except for the face to face interview which lasted for one hour and a 
half. A list of interview questions was prepared by the author, based on the research 
questions and the theoretical framing, modified in light of findings from earlier interviews. 
The issues covered included2:
• Major changes in accounting regulation since the establishment of the equity market in 
1990; contexts of and reasons for change.
• The groups or key individuals involved in these changes.
• Reasons for, and processes of, setting accounting standards.
• The problems and improvement of decision-usefulness of accounting information.
2 Full text of the interview questions is listed in Appendix.
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For the ethical considerations, there were no obvious disadvantages or offences to the 
benefits of the interviewees based on the contents of interviews, except some 
accounting manipulation problems in listed companies.
To minimize the influence of ethical issues on the research, I stress anonymity and 
assurances of confidentiality and try to persuade the respondent of privacy and the 
avoidance of harassment. The interviewees were fully informed of all the relevant 
details of the research, with an opportunity to refuse to participate. Honest identification 
of my research goal was provided to them, and the promise that the research will report 
to no one but the research organization was made. In addition, the respondents were 
informed of the employment of tape-recorder to minimize misrepresentation.
4. Collecting and Analyzing the Data
The methods of daily interactive analysis and framework analysis were used in the 
process of data collection and analysis. The objective of daily interactive analysis is to 
assemble and interpret the information that was collected. Observational notes were 
written down at the end of every day of interviewing based on the information provided 
and related to the main objectives of the study, and initial conclusions/concerns were 
then put down. The daily interactive analysis is important because, as time passes, data 
recorded on tape and in hand written notes becomes increasingly difficult to reconstruct 
information.
After all the interviews were done, framework analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994) was 
carried out in four stages.
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The first stage is to get myself familiar with the data. I listen up to tapes, reading the 
transcripts several times and reading the observational notes taken during interviews 
and summary notes written immediately after the interview.
The next stage involves identifying a thematic framework by writing short phrases, ideas 
or concepts arising from the texts in the margin of the text, and begins to develop 
categories. The data were divided into the following types: the characteristics of the 
Chinese equity market, the situation of accounting information, and the accounting 
reform in improving the decision-usefulness of accounting information. At this stage 
descriptive statements are formed and an analysis was carried out on the data under 
the questioning route.
The third stage is to manage the data. This stage includes indexing, highlighting and 
sorting out quotes. Charting, involves lifting the quotes from their original context and re­
arranging them under the newly-developed appropriate thematic content. Computer- 
based approach to sort out and arrange data, read each quote and find out the relevant 
quote.
The last stage is mapping and interpretation. One of the tasks here is not only to make 
sense of the individual quotes, but also to see the relationship between the quotes and 
the data as a whole.
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5. Interpreting the Data
5.1 Reasons behind the Problems of Accounting Information Disclosure in China
After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, public ownership enterprises and a 
highly-centralized planned economy dominated until share-holding companies 
reappeared in China in the mid 1980s (Karmel, 1996). In October 1990, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange was opened in Shanghai, followed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991, 
to allow public listing and trading of stocks and other securities in China (Ge & Lin, 1993; 
Chen et al., 1999). The two stock exchanges have expanded dramatically since then in 
line with the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. In December 2007, 857 companies 
were listed on the SHSE, with a trading volume of RMB 2959.5 billion in December 
(SHSE, 2007) (USD 1 =RMB 7.30); 729 companies were listed on the SZSE, with a 
trading volume of RMB 673.0 billion in June 2008 (SZSE, 2008) (USD 1 =RMB 6.853). 
The Chinese equity market is now one of the most rapidly growing capital markets in the 
world (CSRC, 2006). Interviewee A remarked:
The rapidly-growing equity market both motivates, and provides a 
greenhouse for, experimenting with accounting standards, since accounting 
standards developed in China were mainly applicable to listed companies.
3 The exchange rate comes from the website of the People's bank of China:
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/huobizhengce/huobizhengcegongju/huilvzhengce/renminbihuilvjiaoyis
houpanjia.asp?page=8&col=&fromyear=&frommonth=&fromday=&toyear=&tomonth=&today=
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However, as previously described, the equity market in China is still a weak equity- 
outsider market, the reasons for which are special ownership structures, weak corporate 
governance mechanisms in listed companies, and the segmentation of the equity 
market.
5.1.1 Special Ownership Structure
The political influence is determined by Chinese political ideology, and remains strong 
through the economic reform, especially the SOEs reform process. In addition, the 
establishment of the equity market was also closely related to the SOEs reform and 
therefore was inextricably intertwined with the government activities (Interviewee C).
As distinct from listed companies in the advanced economies, the majority of the listed 
companies in Chinese equity market started off as SOEs. Some of them were re­
organized and restructured using certain assets carved out4 from SOEs (Qi et al., 2000; 
Ding and Graham, 2007). The offering of shares in the open market has attracted a 
large number of individual and institutional investors. The listed SOEs are mandated to 
have three categories of ownership shares: state-owned shares held by the state, which 
are prohibited from trading publicly; institutional shares (also called legal person shares) 
owned by separate legal entities, such as investment institutions and the foreign 
partners of a corporatized joint venture. These shares also cannot be traded on the two
4 In forming a listed company, promoters would normally “carve out” all or a portion of its 
operating assets (e.g. a factory, a workshop or even a production line) and contribute this into 
the listed company. Assets not attributable to operations and/or other remaining assets are 
generally left behind. Consequently, the promoters and the listed company still maintain on­
going business relationships, for example, up-stream and down-stream in the supply and 
demand chain. As a result, significant related party transactions exist.
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exchanges, though they can be sold to other legal entities by agreement and upon 
approval by the government, and publicly-held shares which represent shares held by 
either institutional or individual investors (Jingu, 2002; Ding et al., 2007). At the end of 
2006, the total outstanding shares of listed Chinese firms included 46.2% of state- 
owned shares, 17.5% of legal entity shares, and 34.8% of shares held by private 
investors (CSRC, 2006). As over 65% of company shares are not publicly tradable on 
the secondary market, their holders care less about share price changes and need 
relatively less information for investment decision-making compared with private 
shareholders. Moreover, these shareholders usually have access to inside information, 
which further reduces the reliance on external accounting information disclosure.
Due to the special ownership structure of listed companies, investors, creditors, and 
other relevant parties outside the enterprises, and management are all identified as the 
users of financial information in the basic accounting standards (EAS, 2000). This is an 
obvious difference compared with the framework of FASB which clearly states that the 
objectives of financial reporting are present and potential investors and creditors and 
other users in making rational investment, credit, and similar decisions (FASB 1978, 
SFAC No.1). Accounting interviewee A remarked:
Clearly, the requirements for financial information in an accounting system that 
satisfied all groups must be significantly different from a system that focuses on 
outside investors. We can not simply adopt many accounting concepts and 
principles developed in other countries to satisfy government and enterprise 
managers equally well.
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Liu (2000), then Deputy Director of Department of Accounting Affairs Management of 
the MoF, acknowledges that accounting regulators in China ‘have given significant 
consideration to the accounting information requirements of the government although 
also taking account of the information needs of the public and other users’.
5.1.2 Weak Corporate Governance Mechanisms
As previously shown, the main differences between Chinese listed companies and listed 
enterprises in other countries are the state retaining a large investment. Many SOEs 
were reformed into limited liability companies with share capital and charters or articles 
of association. The boards of directors have similar structures and responsibilities as 
those in capitalist societies. However, the appointment of top management and 
directors is different from the U.S. and other developed countries. In the early years, the 
state, its ministries, and local government appointed the directors, or had veto power 
over the appointment. In recent years, the state’s role in appointing top managers and 
directors has diminished (Chen et al., 2006).
However, the corporate governance of listed companies remained unregulated until the 
first Regulation for Corporate Governance in listed Companies was issued by the CSRC 
in 2002 (Zhu et al., 2004). Therefore, internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
weak or even non-existent in the listed companies. Denis and McConnell (2003) argue 
that ownership structure is the foundation of internal corporate governance mechanism.
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Corresponding to different ownership structure, corporations should design a different 
system to balance shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, supervisors and managers, 
in order to timely disclose corporate information, efficiently supervise managers and 
protect the interests of shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The corporate 
governance in China was described by Interviewee B as follows:
From the perspective of protecting the interests of minority shareholders, 
the controlling shareholders have great impact on the corporate governance 
improvement. The ownership concentration in China’s listed companies 
makes the controlling shareholders almost dominate entirely the board of 
directors and the board of supervisors, which induces the imbalance of 
corporate governance.
Due to the irrational corporate governance mechanism, accounting manipulation and 
problems of listed companies’ accounting information disclosure are extensive because 
controlling shareholders are much easier to mask true firm performance and conceal 
their private control benefits from outside investors (Liu and Lu, 2002; 2005; Chen et al., 
2007).
There is also a high level of market speculation and manipulation in the market. The 
lack of transparent and reliable accounting information makes following the market price 
be the major investment strategy of most Chinese shareholders, resulting in high market 
speculation (Xiao et al., 2004). Private investors have a very short time horizon of
shareholding of less than one month on average in 20075. In addition, although a 
number of financial institutions were sanctioned by the CSRC; large scale market 
manipulation by investment funds and securities companies is still extensive (CSRC, 
2006). As a result of speculation and market manipulation, market prices are highly 
volatile, which in turn further reduces the value of accounting information.
5.1.3 Segmentation of the Equity Market
Another important feature is the segmentation of Chinese equity market. Dual-class 
publicly-traded shares exists in listed companies: A-shares listed on either the SHSE or 
the SZSE are restricted to mainland Chinese investors; B-shares are issued to and 
traded exclusively among overseas investors (Lin et al., 2005; Groenewold et al., 2003; 
Chen et al.,2002). Although all classes of shares of one listed company are entitled to 
the same future cash flows, the market prices and performance of them are not closely 
related (Muller, 2007). A-share companies are required to present their financial 
statements in line with CAS6, whereas the B-share reports should be restated according 
to the IAS. Due to the gaps between the CAS and the IAS, there remain substantial 
discrepancies between accounting earnings computed under the CAS and the IAS 
(Chen et al., 2002) and reduce the comparability of the accounting information.
5 Data source: SINA finance (http:// finance. Sina.com.cn) (in Chinese).
6 In this study, CAS refers to all the standards and regulations issued by the MoF and the CSRC, 
including the 1993 ASBE, 2000 EAS and the 2006 new ASBE and other regulations and rules.
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Although the equity market has played an important role in accounting standard setting 
in China, its continued structural weaknesses and significant imperfections have 
seriously negatively impact the reliability and comparability of accounting information 
and IAS-type accounting standards (interviewee E).
5.2 Existing Problems of Accounting Information Disclosure
5.2.1 Unreliability of Accounting Information
Financial reporting and information disclosure in Chinese equity market is 
underdeveloped compared with the standards in strong equity-outsider countries. A 
major problem exists in the lack of transparent and reliable accounting information to 
help investors effectively make decisions (Chan and Rotenberg, 1999; Tang, 2000). 
Accounting interviewee A and D pointed out that:
The 1993 ASBE provided some ambiguous requirements for information 
disclosure, and standards for accounting practices left large space for 
accounting manipulation. Moreover, legal and institutional framework of the 
securities markets is still relatively primitive. Concerns have been raised on 
the quality of accounting and reporting practices in China, due to the 
increasing exposures of accounting scandals in the listed companies in 
middle to late 1990s.
5.2.1.1 Financial Fraud due to Accounting Manipulation
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Generally-used methods of financial fraud were summarized by interviewee D and F:
Common types of fraud perpetrated by firms and their managers include inflating 
profit numbers, creating fictitious transactions, and false disclosures.
The following two examples briefly detail equity market scandals that were 
investigated by the CSRC7.
Zheng Baiwen: Falsified Sales Revenues and Profits
In 1997, Zheng Baiwen (600898, SHSE) reported a net profit of RMB812.9 million and a 
return on capital of 20.7%. It was among the largest 100 listed companies in China. In 
1998, the profits collapsed into large losses and the stock price fell dramatically. The 
CSRC stepped in to investigate the firm and found that sales revenues and profits had 
been falsified since 1995 and the information published in the IPO prospectus was a 
sham.
Vitality 28: Lack of Disclosure
Listed in May 1996, Vitality 28 (600703, SHSE) controlled two-thirds of the laundry
detergent market in China. Although the Company had repeatedly denied that it was
7 The source of these two examples is SINA finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn).
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engaged in any joint ventures before its listing, the Company suddenly set up a joint 
venture with the German company Benckiser only 10 days after listing. The deal gave 
the German company 50 years’ right to use its registered brand name. The company 
had failed to disclose this important information in its listing documents. The CSRC also 
found that the Company reported a total of RMB227.92 million in fictitious profit: 
RMB16.68 million on its documents for listing application and a total RMB211.24 million 
from 1996 to 1998. In addition, the Company did not disclose a RMB130 million debt 
owed by its unlisted parent company Vitality 28 Group. This was only one example of 
numbers of important related party transactions which were not disclosed by the 
company.
The audit quality which originates from the lack of audit independence also contributes 
to the accounting information crisis in the late 1990s. Although the Audit Law was 
issued in 1994 and audit reform is underway, the independent status of CPA profession 
in China has not yet established (Tang, 2000; Xiao et al., 2000). Firstly, the involvement 
of the government agencies in the audit profession served as a shield for the 
accountants who did cannot bear full responsibility and the legal liabilities (Yang et al., 
2003). Secondly, the CICPA is directly supervised by the MoF. This subordination 
severely affects the independence of the audit profession (Tang, 2000). Thirdly, 
government-affiliated audit firms were still the dominant group in the audit market (Yang 
et al., 2003). Thus, the widespread government ownership of both clients and their 
auditors gives rise to potential conflicts of interest in audit practice and finally impact the 
audit quality.
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5.2.1.2 Major Means to Accounting Manipulation: Related Party Transaction as an 
Example
China’s listed companies tend to manipulate earnings for the purpose of obtaining the 
rights to issue new equity after an IPO and avoiding de-listing (Liu and Lu, 2002).
In 1996 the CSRC regulated that the annual ROE must be no less than 10% for China’s 
listed companies to issue additional shares. In 1999, the CSRC revised the qualification 
for issuing additional equity, requiring that a listed company has to maintain a minimal 
ROE of 6% for recent three years, and the average ROE over these three years must 
be no less than 10% (CSRC, 1999). Because a listed company's application for 
permission to issue new shares is conditional on the ROE, listed firms have strong 
incentives to manage earnings above those thresholds. In fact, a disproportionately high 
number of companies were found to report ROEs just slightly over 6% and 10% in 
recent years (Liu and Lu, 2007). Some methods generally used by listed companies to 
manipulate profit were identified: through increasing investment income; through non- 
operational activities; through enlarging credit sales or recognizing revenue in advance; 
through transactions with related parties (interviewee D and F).
Among these methods, interviewee D and F thought that the transactions with related 
parties are prevalent in China’s listed companies due to its diversity of forms and 
China’s special ownership structure. Table 4 shows that the proportion of companies 
with related party transactions is quite high.
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Table 4 Data of Related Party Transactions in China’s Listed Companies
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
The number of 
listed companies 851 949 1088 1160 1224
Number of listed 
companies in 
which related party 
transaction took 
place
678 420 983 949 710
% 79.7% 44.3% 90.4% 81.8% 58.0%
Data sources: Fan Gu, Linqi Lan, “Shanghai Security Weekly”, October 2003 (in 
Chinese)
The purpose of related party transactions is costs saving and tax shield (Zhong, 2005). 
However, as Table 5 shows, among the 606 companies that disclosed related party 
transactions, the proportion of related purchase and sale in related party transactions in 
China’s listed companies was quite low, only accounting for 12.7% and 13.5% of all 
forms of related party transactions. Most of the related party transactions were equity 
investment, assets disposal and share disposal, the total amount of which accounts for an 
unusual 80% of all forms of related party transactions. Thus, it is possible that the listed 
companies had planned most of the transactions purposely. Interviewee F explained:
...At the end of one fiscal year, due to increasing operational pressure, we 
planned more related party transactions to manipulate profit in order to enhance 
performance purposely and cater to the market expectation. As far as I know, it is
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very common for listed companies to arrive at predetermined profit target through 
related party transactions...
Table 5 Forms of Related Party Transactions in 2002
(RMB millions)
Forms of related 
party
transactions
Amount % Number of 
transactions
% Number of 
corporations
%
Raw material 26351.3 16.4 118 8.5 77 12.7
purchase and
service receiving
Raw material 25581.5 16.0 140 10.1 82 13.5
sales and service
providing
Assets disposal 17614.0 11.0 155 11.2 124 20.5
Assets purchase 28810.4 18.0 32 2.31 25 4.1
Equity investment 30034.5 18.7 407 29.4 267 44.1
Equity shares 3864.3 2.4 122 8.8 92 15.2
disposal
Assets 12035.7 7.5 96 6.9 83 13.7
replacement
Surety 6319.3 3.9 53 3.8 36 5.9
Lease 5765.6 3.6 74 5.3 60 9.9
Trust operation 2315.0 1.4 37 2.7 33 5.5
Total 160295 100 1385 100 606 100
Data source: Huang, B. (2003) , ‘Research on Supervision Problems in Related Party
Transaction in Chinese Listed Companies’, Shenzhen Zhongyan (in Chinese)
The disclosure problems of related party transactions in China’s listed companies can 
be classified as three categories: insufficient disclosure or no disclosure, untimely 
disclosure, and false disclosure.
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First, listed companies do not disclose the related party transaction sufficiently or do not 
disclose at all. As the interim report of 1997 showed, though 116 listed companies 
disclosed related purchase and selling transactions, only 27 companies only showed 
the existence of the transactions. Companies disclosing the detailed price of each 
transaction were 67, accounting for only 57.8% of all 116 companies (SHSE, 2000).
Second, listed companies disclose related party transactions untimely. Due to the 
asymmetry of accounting information, related party transactions must be disclosed 
sufficiently and timely to current and potential shareholders. Otherwise, it can damage 
the interests of the stakeholders who had relatively less information. For example, 
Jiabao Industry (600622, SHSE) provided investment of RMB 16 million for its 
subsidiary Shanghai Jiabaoqiyi Real Estate Corporation in early 1998. All these 
transactions should have be disclosed in the interim report of 1998, however, Jiabao 
Industry did not disclose the transaction until the interim report of 1999 (SHSE, 2000).
Third, listed companies usually choose to disclose untrue information after manipulating 
profit through related party transactions, with the intention to meet certain ROE 
threshold to stay listed, to impact the stock market price, to evaluate the management 
achievement or to finance conveniently. For example, in December 1996 Qiong 
Minyuan (000508, SZSE, already de-listed) made up profit RMB 540 million through 
invalid contracts of building construction and equity disposal with related party8.
8 The example is from SINA finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn).
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5.2.2 Incomparability of Accounting Information across Countries
Although Chinese accounting regulatory body made efforts to converge towards the IAS, 
accounting information from financial reporting were quite different under the CAS and 
the IAS. Chen et al. (2002) empirically testifies that the earnings gap based on IAS and 
CAS is quite remarkable. Chen et al. (1999) document significant differences between 
the 1993 the ASBE and the IAS. They compared the CAS with the IAS for twelve factors 
that are responsible for the differences in reported accounting earnings under these two 
alternative sets of accounting rules. Differences regarding required accounting were 
identified to contribute a lot to differences in financial reporting under the CAS and the 
IAS (Chen et al., 1999). Interviewee A remarked:
The poorly developed capital market in China has also placed many constraints 
on the adoption of accounting methods. For example, the 2000 Enterprise 
Accounting System had to suspend the adoption of the fair value approach to 
valuation of assets, which was previously stipulated in an accounting standard, 
because it is impossible to obtain a fair value for many assets in the Chinese 
capital market. This indicates that an immature capital market provides a poor 
context within which accounting standards may evolve and develop.
5.2.2.1 The Choice of Fair Value and Historical Cost Approach
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The choice between fair value and historical cost approach for evaluation is an 
important difference of accounting practices between the IAS and the CAS. Historical 
cost method was always used in China’s traditional accounting system and was also 
introduced into the 1993 ASBE. It has its own advantages and disadvantages, just as 
Interviewee B summarized:
Historical cost has its merits of objectivity, applicability, and verifiability. However, 
it failed to reflect current dynamic economic reality in many cases. Therefore, 
various modifications have been adopted in practice. A mixture of historical cost 
and current value becomes common and is recognized by accounting standards- 
setting bodies in many countries.
Historical cost approach was strictly adhered to by China’s 1993 ASBE, and any 
deviation to historical cost was prohibited. To illustrate:
The values of all assets should be recorded at historical costs at the time of acquisition. 
The amount recorded in books of account should not be adjusted even though a 
fluctuation in their value may occur, except when State laws or regulations require 
specific treatment or adjustments. (Article 19)
Marketable securities should be accounted for according to historical cost as obtained. 
Marketable securities should be shown in book balance in accounting statement. 
(Article 26)
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All inventories shall be accounted for at historical cost as obtained....All the inventories 
shall be disclosed at historical cost in accounting statement. (Article 28) (ASBE, 1993)
The choice between historical cost and fair value was determined by reliability and 
relevance of accounting information (interviewee B). The application of fair value by the 
IAS reflects that dynamic economic environment where timely and forward-looking 
information is crucial, and the decision making depends more on the relevance of 
accounting information than on the reliability (Tang, 2000). Interviewee B explained the 
reason for Chinese chose to use the historical cost method:
You can attribute it to the SOEs restructuring. With the transform from SOEs 
to listed companies, state-owned assets should be revalued. However, 
comparable market values are unobtainable for most of state-owned assets 
except for the purchase price. If fair value method is adopted, there exists 
room for accounting manipulation. Enterprises are afraid to be blamed for 
providing false accounting information. This led to a judgment that reliability 
must be put before the relevance in developing accounting standards.
5.2.2.2 The Lack of Conservatism Accounting Convention
Some researchers contend that the differences between the CAS and the IAS lay
mainly in a lack of the “conservatism accounting convention” in Chinese accounting
(Shun, 1996). For instance, Chen et al. (2002) and Chen et al. (1999) compared the
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accounting information released by Chinese listed companies that had simultaneously 
issued A- and B shares. They conclude that a substantial overstatement of income or 
assets exists in those firms’ financial reporting for A-share (prepared under Chinese 
accounting standards) in contrast with their financial statement for B-share reporting 
(prepared under the IAS). Those studies suggest the major causes underlying the 
discrepancies may come from the less conservative treatments of bad-debt allowances 
and depreciation, varied procedures to account for goodwill amortization, pension costs 
and other employee benefits, R&D spending, tax expenses, and a lack of provision for 
inventory price decline or value impairment of long term assets or investments (Shun, 
1996; Chen et al., 1999).
Evaluation methods and the lack of prudence accounting convention are only two 
examples for the differences of accounting practices between the IAS and the CAS. 
Interviewee B remarked:
The convergence of Chinese accounting standards to the IAS is inevitable due to 
the requirements from the development of the equity market. However, immature 
equity market, SOE restructuring and other inertial factors such as accounting 
tradition determines that the convergence could be a gradual and long process.
5.3 The Response of the Accounting System to the Problems of Financial 
Information Disclosure
The efforts to improve the decision-usefulness of accounting information began in 1993 
with the implementation of the new accounting system. As earlier mentioned, the efforts
could be summarized from two aspects: the issuance new standards to narrow the gaps 
of accounting practices between the CAS and the IAS, and the issuance of regulations 
and requirements for information disclosure (interviewee C).
5.3.1 Narrowing the Gaps of Accounting Practices between the CAS and the IAS
There are three stages of accounting standards reform in China in 1993, 2000 and 2006 
respectively. Each stage represents a big step in convergence towards the IAS.
5.3.1.1 The First Stage 1993-1998: 1993 Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises
With the rapid development of the securities market, business transactions became 
more and more complex. There was a call for a conceptual framework and detailed 
Accounting Standards (Xiang, 1998; Chen et al., 1999). The 1993 ASBE defined the 
basic accounting elements as follows: asset (Chapter 3), liability (Chapter 4), equity 
(Chapter 5), revenue (Chapter 6), expense (Chapter 7) and income or profit (Chapter 8). 
According to the Chinese 1993 set, then, the recognition, representation and reporting 
of these basic elements as a system produced the financial statements (Chapter 9), 
articulated around the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement (income statement), 
the statement of changes in financial position, the supplementary statements and notes 
and the statement of financial affairs.
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These basic elements are common sense for Western accountants and accounting 
users, but were the first time formally introduced into Chinese accounting standards as 
standards that should applied by all types of enterprise entities. The state-owned 
enterprises were being changed from ‘production units’ towards entities with more 
autonomy and operating responsibility. And the general purpose of the accounting 
system was to assist the financial practices of the enterprise to be accounted for on an 
accrual basis, away from central planning and management, previously accounted for 
on a cash basis (Aiken et al., 1995; p160).
The new objectives of the 1993 set were briefly summarized in Chapter 2 as follows: (1) 
to meet the needs of macro-economic management, (2) to allow relevant parties to 
assess the financial position and operating results of the business enterprises they are 
concerned with, and (3) to meet the information needs of business management 
(ASBE,1993). Thus, the new system aimed to serve the re-shaped needs of 
governmental control and regulation, the emerging needs of new stakeholders in the 
autonomous entities that are in formation, and the new needs of responsible 
management at the enterprise level.
The introduction of ASBE was considered most significant as Interviewee B said:
It signaled the end of traditional accounting in China. For the first time in 
Chinese accounting history, the ASBE brought China's accounting 
practice into close conformity with the IAS. And before the conceptual
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framework was released, accounting practice varied among enterprises 
with different types of ownership, different industrial sectors and different 
business purposes. For the first time, the ASBE provided a unified 
accounting framework to all Chinese business enterprises and they 
supersede all previously promulgated “accounting regulations”. In 
addition, the new accounting system initiated a transition from rule- 
based accounting regulations to transaction-based accounting standards 
in the regulatory framework of Chinese accounting.
5.3.1.2 The Second Stage 1998-2005: 2000 Enterprise Accounting System
A series of financial scandals of listed companies were exposed throughout the late 
1990s. Extensive false reporting and earnings management by companies have 
discredited accounting information and hampered the development of the capital market.
In response to these financial scandals, the MoF issued Accounting Regulations for 
Listed Companies in 1998. The Accounting Law was amended in 1999 to stress the 
importance of ‘true and complete’ accounting information. In 2000, new accounting 
regulations were issued by the MoF, as interviewee C said:
A series of regulatory responses were needed in the case of serious 
accounting information crisis. These series of regulations and new 
standards aimed to reduce the scope for manipulation that can take
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place under the looser definition provided in the ASBE. Therefore, they 
were expected to enhance the comparability of accounting information.
In 1999, Enterprise Financial Reporting Regulation issued by the State Council 
redefined the elements of financial statements in line with the IAS (Xiao et al., 2004). 
These definitions were further elaborated in the Enterprise Accounting System issued in 
2000.
The Enterprise Accounting System defined basic concepts, elements of financial 
statements, recognition and measurement principles, permissible accounting methods, 
structures and content of the main financial statements (EAS, 2000). The revised 
accounting standards introduced important changes to existing practices. The changes 
also included reducing orientation towards the government, as government is no longer 
emphasized as the most important user group. This meant Chinese accounting system 
stressed more on the needs of outsider investors and were determined to further their 
efforts to provide more transparent and decision-useful accounting information (Xiao et 
al., 2004; Chen et al., 2002; Biondi and Zhang, 2007).
The most significant change in these new standards and regulations, as interviewee C 
said, was a more expanded application of the prudence principle than that was first 
prescribed in ASBE in 1993.
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Conservatism in accounting standards was gradually stressed due to the impact from 
the Asian economic crisis and changes in the Chinese economy. In the 1998 
Accounting Regulation for Listed Companies, the application of conservatism 
accounting conventions were typically reflected by requirements for enough provision 
for possible losses of short-term investments, receivables, inventory, and long-term 
investments. The regulations removed such ambiguous requirements as free 
management discretion to choose between cost and equity methods in accounting for 
long-term investment with share holding (Chen et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2002). 
Differences caused by allowance for bad debts, long-term investment valuation and 
deferred tax and other tax-related items were largely eliminated with the implementation 
of the new regulations. All these changes were expected to reduce about 40 percent of 
the total difference of reported earnings between the CAS and the IAS (Chen et al., 
1999).
From the discussion above, the revised regulation significantly narrows the gap 
between the CAS and the IAS (accounting interviewee A).
5.3.1.3 The Third Stage 2006- : 2006 new Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises
The new 2006 ASBE included a revised conceptual framework (the basic statement) 
and 38 revised specific accounting standards. It did not simply expand the disclosure 
requirements but made fundamental changes to current CAS. It covered nearly all of the 
topics under the current IFRS literature. These standards were substantially in line with
48
IFRSs, except for certain modifications which reflect China’s unique circumstances and 
environment (Deloitte, 2006).
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) identified a number of accounting 
issues for which China, because of its unique circumstances and environment, could be 
“particularly helpful to the IASB in finding high quality solutions for the IAS” (Liu, 2007). 
These issues include disclosure of related party transactions, business combinations 
involving enterprises under common control, and fair value measurements (Liu, 2007). 
The disclosure of related party transactions was in a process of improvement 
throughout the period of late 1990s to early 2000s. Application of the fair value 
measurements for the first time in the 2006 ASBE was a response to the IASB 
requirements (Interviewee C).
Although fair value was fully adopted in some areas, such as non-monetary transactions 
and marketable securities, in many cases where full adoption of fair value might be 
impractical or theoretically unsound, partial adoption were carried out. For example, 
iinvestment property and biological assets may be measured at fair value if certain 
criteria are met, and the historical cost basis remains the benchmark approach (Biondi 
and Zhang, 2007). This is a big step for Chinese accounting standards to converge 
towards the IAS and the revision of accounting methods of business combination is 
under way (Xie and Tian, 2000).
5.3.2 Regulation and Requirements for Information Disclosure
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The Chinese accounting standards and the CSRC regulations are continuously 
improved in terms of information disclosure of listed companies, as interviewee B 
remarked:
The listed companies’ information disclosure been promoted greatly compared 
with the situations in 1997 when the regulations for and supervision over 
information disclosure were embryonic: the content of information disclosure is 
now more detailed; the authenticity, the concept definitions are clearer; and 
the supervision is more efficient and independent.
5.3.2.1 Regulations of Information Disclosure by the MoF
From 1997 to 1998, eight specific accounting standards were formally promulgated by 
the MoF. They were: Disclosure of Related Party Relationships and Transactions, Cash 
Flow Statements, Events Occurring after the Balance Sheet Date, Debt Restructuring, 
Investments, Construction Contracts, Changes in Accounting Policies and Accounting 
Estimates, Revenue. Among these eight specific accounting standards, only Cash Flow 
Statements and Debt Restructuring are applicable to all enterprises while the remaining 
six are initially applicable to listed companies9. For a listed company, these standards 
ask for detailed useful and reliable information in its annual report. Thus, we can 
conclude that specific standards responded directly to the demand of the stock market 
(interviewee B).
9 Data source: the website of the MoF (http://www.mof.gov.cn/) (in Chinese).
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For example, among these eight specific accounting standards, Disclosure of Related 
Party Relationships and Transactions was the first detailed accounting standard being 
issued to tackle the increasing acute earnings manipulation via related party 
transactions. Before its issuance, there was no requirement or standard for the 
disclosure of related party transactions (Zhong, 2005). This standard requires that when 
transactions are conducted between related parties, the nature, type and other pertinent 
information of the transaction should be disclosed in the financial statements. Factors to 
be disclosed include the amount involved or applicable %, outstanding balance and the 
basis to determine transfer prices. If ownership relationship exists, and if the related 
party is an enterprise, then regardless of whether transactions have been conducted 
between these parties, certain information (including primary operating scope, 
shareholding ratios and change in equity, etc.) should be clearly disclosed in the 
footnotes to the financial statements10.
In 2001, the MoF issued Provisional Regulations on Accounting Treatments o f Assets 
Sale Among Related Parties, which required that all the obvious unfair transactions’ 
price difference must not been recognized as profit of the current fiscal year. Together 
with the specific standard concerning related party transaction, detailed and explicit 
regulations were provided to regulate the disclosure of listed companies’ related 
transactions in China in responses to the phenomena that more and more companies 
used related transactions to enhance their performance.
10 Data source: the website of the MoF (http://www.mof.gov.cn/) (in Chinese).
5.3.2.2 Requirements for Information Disclosure by the CSRC
The regulatory framework for financial reporting has just taken shape in China, as the 
government has paid increasing attention to regulating accounting and information 
disclosure for the equity market. It was framed fully based on the requirements for 
disclosure by the SEC (Zhang, 2007; Zhang and Li, 1998).
In order to regulate the content and form of the information disclosure of listed 
companies, in June 1993, the CSRC issued an exposure draft of Standards o f Contents 
and Formats o f Information Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies according to 
Provisional Byelaw o f Stock Issuance and Exchange (CSRC, 1994). These regulations 
not only define the specific content and form of the financial reporting, but are also the 
guide to audit the financial reports of listed companies (CSRC, 1994). In 1997, the 
CSRC established the formal draft, and later revised it separately in1998, 1999, 2001 
and 2003 in response to continuing demands from the equity market, and has founded 
a basically mature framework now (SINA finance).
In Table 6, Contents and formats of Annual Report (part of Standards of Contents and 
Formats of Information Disclosure by Public Issuing companies) serve as an example to 
discuss the changes of Content and Formats of Information Disclosure from 1993 to 
2003. The standards issued in 1993, 1998 and 2003 were compared.
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Table 6 the Transformation of Contents and formats of Annual Report
Contents 1993 1998 2003
Company profile 
Financial and 
Operation 
Overviews
/
/
/
/
/
/
Changes in Share 
Capital 
and Shareholdings
/ /
Shareholders’
Meeting
/ /
Business Report / /
Directors’ Report / / /
Supervisors’ Report /
Significant Events / / /
Financial reporting 
Documents 
Available for 
Inspection
/
/
/
/
/
/
Corporate
governance
/
Directors, 
Supervisors, Senior 
Officers Employees
/
Important Notice /
Data source: CSRC Public Statements (1993, 1998, 2003).
From Table 6, we can find out that the content of required information disclosure keeps 
expanding. The disclosure of important notice, the situation of directors, supervisors,
management personnel, and employee and corporate governance are emphasized.
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Other documents by the CSRC include the Answers to the Information Disclosure 
Regulations o f Public Issuing Companies in 2001, Preparing Rules o f Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies issued in 2002, and Regulations on Information 
Disclosure o f Listed Companies in 2006. The series of regulations provide more explicit 
and detailed requirements for the information disclosure, as interviewee E said:
Now we may take much more time preparing the annual report than when the 
regulations for information disclosure were introduced in middle 1990s... The 
requirements keep changing and new regulations are continuously added to 
old ones. It is much harder to keep any inside information away from 
outsiders than before...
6. Findings
From the analysis above, a number of implications can be given for the relationship 
between the equity market and accounting reform in China.
First, requirements for high-quality accounting information link the development of
Chinese equity market and accounting reform together. With the development of equity
market, government involvement in SOEs management has gradually reduced. Equity
market has gradually turned the SOEs from production units under central planning to
listed entities with managerial autonomy and self-responsibility. On the other hand, the
equity-outside market is getting stronger and the interests of outside investors should be
fully considered. What is put into priority in satisfying their needs is to provide
transparent and decision-useful accounting information of the listed companies (Ball et
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al., 2003). The requirements for high quality accounting information became the main 
motivation for the improvement of accounting reform in China. “There is no doubt that 
the history of the development of China’s equity market and accounting system is a 
history of the improvement of the quality of accounting information” (interviewee B).
Second, the weak equity-outside market in China leads to several problems of the 
decision-usefulness of accounting information. The weak equity-outside market is 
characterized by a specific ownership structure, in which the majority of shares are non­
tradable and the minority of shares is held by outside investors, and a weak corporate 
governance mechanism, which offers great incentives to controlling shareholder to 
transfer resources away from firms for the benefits of themselves by accounting 
manipulation (Liu and Lu, 2002). Moreover, the segmentation of equity market adds to 
these structural weaknesses which altogether results in unreliable and incomparable 
accounting information.
Third, the accounting reform engaged in improving the quality of accounting information 
by issuing standards to narrow down the differences of accounting practices between 
the CAS and the IAS and regulations for information disclosure. These efforts are 
gradually carried out through the past 18 years after the establishment of equity market. 
The implementation of three sets of basic accounting in 1993, 2000 and 2006 
respectively aimed to converge towards the IAS and reduce the incomparability of 
accounting information across countries. The regulations for information disclosure 
issued by the MoF and the CSRC purported to guarantee a more reliable and 
transparent financial reporting.
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Through the discussions and analysis, there is no doubt that the development of equity 
market greatly helps the accounting system transform from a rigid uniform and central- 
planned economy-based accounting system to an IAS-oriented system, through its 
requirements for the decision-usefulness of accounting information. China has reached 
an obvious improvement on the quality of indigenous accounting and reporting and also 
on the information disclosure in China’s securities market through harmonization with 
the international conventions.
However, without a further reform of the ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanism of the listed companies, the immature equity market will hinder the 
effectiveness of information disclosure, and in turn the application of the accounting 
standards and regulations. China needs to devote itself further into this process in the 
future. The country will have to continue its move toward implementing a sophisticated 
and transparent accounting system.
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7. Appendix 
List of Questions in Interview Instrument
1. What was the background of the establishment of equity market in China?
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2. Before the establishment of the equity market in 1990, how were the accounting 
practices in the SOEs? How was the political intervention influence their daily 
operation?
3. How are the requirements for accounting information from different interest groups, 
like the state, institutional or individual investors?
4. After these SOEs went into listing, how did the government intervention affect them? 
How does the government control decide the ownership structure of the listed 
companies and affect the accounting information disclosure? How the corporate 
governance of listed companies affect the disclosure of accounting information?
5. Why do the financial scandals occur frequently in the late 1990s? What are the main 
means to accounting manipulation? Could you give some examples of financial 
frauds in the listed companies?
6. What are the major differences between the IAS and the CAS? Why do these 
differences remain?
7. What is the role of 1992 ASBE in the process of accounting reform?
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8. Compared with the 1992 ASBE, what are the major changes of the 2000 Enterprise 
Accounting System and 2006 ASBE to narrow the gap between the CAS and the 
IAS?
9. As a regulatory body for listed companies, which major steps has the CSRC taken to 
improve the accounting information disclosure?
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